

CHAPTER VII

KEREVES DERE AND GULLY RAVINE

(Sketches 6, 7 8)

THE FRENCH ATTACK ON THE 21ST JUNE

IN making preparations for their new advance on Achi Baba, Generals Gouraud and Hunter-Weston took advantage of the experience gained in the battle of the 4th June. On that occasion, the failure to get forward on both flanks involved the eventual loss of most of the ground gained in the centre of the line. The battle had emphasized the need of a much heavier concentration of howitzer fire on the front of attack, and it was plain that, in view of the small number of howitzers available, the only alternative was a succession of attacks on a far narrower front.

For the new advance, therefore, the two corps commanders decided that the network of Turkish trenches crowning the high ground on each flank should first be captured by two independent operations, supported by massed artillery. A third attack could then be launched to bring the centre up into line. It was further agreed that the first operation should be carried out by the French, with the strictly limited object of capturing the crest of Kereves Spur, known to the Turks as Hill 83. Sir Ian Hamilton approved these arrangements; he gave General Gouraud a free hand in the conduct of his own operation, and no orders on the subject were issued from G.H.Q.

The plans for this attack, called by the French the Third Action of Kereves Dere and by the Turks the Battle of Hill 83, were prepared with meticulous care. "L'attaque", wrote General Gouraud in his preliminary instructions, "n'est jamais trop minutieusement ni trop secrètement préparée." The assault was fixed for the 21st June.

The front selected by General Gouraud was only some 650 yards wide. The right half of the attack was to penetrate the enemy's line for a distance of 350 yards, to a trench overlooking

the head of "Le Ravin de la Mort". The left half had not so far to go, but its objective included the two redoubts known as the Haricot and the Quadrilateral. The Turkish *2nd Division* was holding the line opposite the French, with the *12th Division* in reserve.

Colonel Girodon, commanding the Metropolitan Brigade, and formerly the chief of General Gouraud's staff,¹ was to command the operation. The troops for the attack consisted of three regiments, each of three battalions: of these the 176th Regiment was on the left, the 6th Colonial Regiment on the right, and the 2nd Régiment de marche d'Afrique in reserve.

The artillery to support the attack amounted to seven batteries of 75's, two batteries of 155-mm. howitzers, sixteen trench mortars, and seven British howitzers, or roughly one gun to every ten yards of front. Six batteries of 75's were to fire on the remainder of the Turkish trenches opposite the French, while two batteries and some heavy guns were to be employed in counter-battery work against the Asiatic shore. The French battleship *Saint-Louis* was also to help in neutralizing the Asiatic guns. Two French batteries supporting the Royal Naval Division were to co-operate on the left, and the infantry of that division was to assist by keeping the trenches on its right front under rifle and machine-gun fire.

The bombardment was to begin at 5.15 A.M., and to last for three-quarters of an hour. At 6 A.M. the guns would increase their range and the infantry assault. The task of the 6th Colonial Regiment on the right entailed the capture of two, and in some cases of three, lines of trenches. The 176th, on a somewhat broader front, was to capture and hold the Quadrilateral and Haricot redoubts, after which its right was to swing forward to join hands with the 6th Colonial Regiment. A company of the regiment in reserve was to be on the extreme left of the 176th, to cover its advance with fire. Supporting battalions were to follow close in rear of the assaulting troops and to occupy the various Turkish trenches as soon as the leading waves had passed over them.

Each unit commander was to ensure that every man under his command was given a definite objective and a definite task, that he knew the exact spot in the enemy's trenches he had to make for, and what he was to do on reaching it. Bombers were, however, still scarce in the French corps. Each company was ordered to equip six men with bombs, but "only if sufficient

¹ He had been appointed to command the Metropolitan Brigade of the French 2nd Division on the 7th Jure, *vice* General Ganeval, killed in action.

THE FRENCH ATTACK ON THE 21ST JUNE 81

"trained men are available for this duty". All assaulting troops were to be in position by 4.30 A.M., and arrangements were made to give them, before zero hour, a hot meal consisting of soup, coffee and bread. A special ration of spirits was drawn overnight for issue with the coffee, and spirits were added to the water in the men's water-bottles. Each company was provided with two red and two blue flags, the former to call for artillery support, in case of counter-attack, the latter to call for small-arm ammunition.

In one important respect the French had a great advantage over their British comrades: they were rich in gun ammunition. Large quantities of high-explosive shell were arriving regularly from France; for several days before the 21st June the front of attack was kept under a hot fire, and, compared with previous actions on the peninsula the preliminary bombardment on the morning of the battle was very heavy and accurate.¹ Except on the extreme left, it wrecked the enemy's front-line trenches and killed most of their garrison.

When, therefore, the bombardment lifted and the troops surged forward to the assault, the leading lines were almost everywhere successful in gaining their first objectives. On the front of the 176th Regiment, except on the extreme left where the Quadrilateral defied all assaults, the whole of the Turkish second-line trenches, including the Haricot redoubt, were carried without a check and with surprisingly little loss.² These positions were consolidated and several Turkish counter-attacks were beaten off.

On the right, the 6th Colonial Regiment was less successful. The enemy's front-line trench was captured, but on this part of the front the Turks were still in some strength in their second line, and the Colonial troops were unable to make further progress. As a result, the captured front-line trench became badly over-crowded. Practically destroyed by the French bombardment, and choked with Turkish dead, it offered little cover. Its occupants began to suffer heavily, and Colonel Noguès, commanding the regiment, was badly wounded.

¹ The French official account contrasts the ammunition expenditure on 4th June with that on the 21st June as follows:

	Yds. Frontage.	Rounds Fired.		
		Field.	Artillery. Heavy.	Trench mortars.
4th	1,500	3,500	533	nil
21st	650	28,000	2,700	700

² Colonel Girodon, watching the advance from the French parapet, was badly wounded.

June. Disorder followed, and about 7 A.M. the Colonials fell back to their starting-point.

After a fresh bombardment the assault was renewed at mid-day, but was driven back with loss. Again at 2.15 P.M. the Turkish trenches were heavily shelled and another attack was launched, but again without success. But General Gouraud, determined that the gains on his left flank should not be sacrificed, issued an order to the 2nd Division at 3 P.M. that the Turkish trench in front of it must be captured at all costs before nightfall.


The new attack was fixed for 6 P.M., but at the request of the Colonials was postponed for three quarters of an hour. At 6.45 the attacking troops were still unready, and asked for another delay. General Gouraud thereupon ordered the Régiment de marche d'Afrique to carry out the assault. This was done successfully; touch was gained with the troops on the left flank, and the long day ended on a heartening note of victory.

On the 23rd and two following days, the French carried out some minor attacks in an attempt to complete the work of the 21st. These efforts were not successful, and, though a little progress was made in the centre, an attack on the Quadrilateral, ill-supported by artillery, was beaten back with considerable loss.

On balance, however, the results obtained by the French between the 21st-25th June were satisfactory. The Turks, it is true, were still in force on the western side of Kereves Dere, and as long as they held the Quadrilateral no progress could be made immediately to the south of it or on the front of the Royal Naval Division. Nevertheless, the French were now strongly established on the crest of Kereves Spur, and the approaches to the centre of their line had been freed from enemy observation. Above all, the morale of the French troops had been appreciably raised, and the important lesson learned that, given an adequate artillery preparation, the Turkish positions were certainly not impregnable. Unfortunately the French casualties in the four days' fighting had amounted to over 2,500 killed and wounded. But there was every evidence that the Turkish losses had been heavier, and the captured trenches were piled high with dead.

According to the Turkish official account, the Turkish losses in the battle were over 6,000, and their 2nd Division suffered so heavily that it had to be withdrawn from the peninsula, its place being taken by the 12th Division which had reinforced it on the 21st June. A few days later the 1st Division

Sketch 7.



arrived in the southern zone from Constantinople, followed at the beginning of July by the 4th Division. Despite their recent losses, therefore, the strength of the Turks on the peninsula was steadily mounting.

THE ACTION OF GULLY RAVINE

In order to reap full advantage from the success of the 21st June, Sir Ian Hamilton was anxious that the projected attack on Gully Spur should follow as soon as possible. But the governing factor was the time required by the French to organize the fire of their heavy howitzers, which were to assist the British attack.¹ This work was finished by the 27th, and the attack was fixed for the morning of the 28th.

The Turkish defences to be captured on Gully Spur consisted of five lines of deep narrow trenches, linked together by a long transverse trench which crowned the face of the cliff. The two furthest trenches (J12 and J13)² formed in actual fact the right flank of an intermediate trench system which the Turks had lately begun between their main position facing the Allies and their new rear position immediately south of Achi Baba. Every day of late the Turks had been working on this intermediate line, and, owing to the shortage of ammunition and the strict injunction that not more than two rounds per gun per day were to be expended except in case of attack, the British artillery could do little to interfere with them. Nevertheless, except on the extreme Turkish right, this new line still consisted only of short lengths of unconnected trenches. The capture of J12 and J13, therefore, would not only outflank the enemy's position, in the centre of which a considerable breach had been made on the 4th June: it would secure a valuable foothold in the only part of his new intermediate position which was as yet in any way complete.

The failure against the J trenches on the 4th June had been principally due to lack of howitzer support. But much of the resistance encountered had come from Turkish posts on both banks of Gully Ravine. For this reason, with Sir Ian Hamilton's approval, General Hunter-Weston had decided not to confine

¹ Owing to the shortage of British high-explosive shell, the French Minister of War had promised Lord Kitchener to keep the French corps sufficiently supplied to enable it to give artillery support when required to the VIII Corps.

² It will facilitate the study of this and subsequent actions to notice that in the British trench maps all Turkish trenches on Gully Spur were given the prefix J. Those on Fir Tree Spur, east of Gully Ravine, had the prefix H. The G trenches were between Kirte and Kanlı Dere; and the F trenches east of Kanlı Dere.

June. his new attack to Gully Spur, but to include in it an advance up Gully Ravine, as far as the mouth of a tributary called the "Nullah", and also the capture of two lines of trenches (H12a and H12) on Fir Tree Spur, on a frontage of about 700 yards.

The position to be attacked was undeniably strong, and comprised several redoubts armed with machine guns and capable of all-round defence. The trenches were not, however, provided with deep dug-outs, and were unlikely to withstand a heavy bombardment by howitzers and high-explosive shell. The main ravine and its numerous tributaries offered a covered approach for reserves. There was a good deal of wire in front of some of the trenches, but wire was not reaching the Turks in sufficient quantities to permit the construction of really serious obstacles. At no time in the campaign, indeed, except perhaps at the original landing at W and V Beaches, were the Turkish entanglements comparable to those on the Western front.

The strength of the Turks opposite the VIII Corps was still uncertain, but the front to be attacked was apparently held by the *11th Division*, with the *6th Division* in reserve behind Hill 472. The artillery covering the front probably consisted of ten field and mountain batteries and ten medium and heavy howitzers and guns.

General Hunter-Weston placed Major-General de Lisle in command of the attack, and all the plans for the infantry were left to him. In addition to his own division,¹ with the Indian brigade attached, the 156th Brigade of the 52nd Division was, by special permission of the Commander-in-Chief,² placed at his disposal for the battle. As regards artillery support, General de Lisle was free to express his wishes as to the distribution of the guns available, but all the artillery remained under the direct command of the VIII Corps. The artillery consisted of some 77 guns, including twelve British and nine French howitzers, and the attack was further supported by a cruiser and two destroyers lying off the coast.

The British ammunition supply was still lamentably small, and not a round of high-explosive was available for the 18-pdrs.

¹ The 86th Brigade had now been reconstituted under the command of Br.-General O. C. Wolley-Dod.

² See page 70. Sir Ian, having now heard that a further reinforcing division was coming out from home, decided to spare a brigade of the 52nd for the Helles operations.

³ Four 10-pdrs., three 12-pdrs. (naval guns recently landed); six 15-pdrs.; forty 18-pdrs.; three 60-pdrs.; four 4.5-inch howitzers; four 5-inch howitzers; four 6-inch howitzers, and nine (according to French records, eight) 155-mm. French howitzers. The French also sent two heavy trench mortars for bombarding the Boomerang redoubt.

Nevertheless, by sanctioning the use of nearly a third of the total June stock of ammunition at Heiles for this one small operation, it was possible to allot a larger proportion of rounds to the frontage of attack than for any previous action on the British front. Including the ammunition to be fired by the supporting ships and the French howitzers, General de Lisle was able to count on the expenditure of at least 12,000 rounds in the course of the day's battle, and, in point of fact, this figure was very largely exceeded.¹

General de Lisle decided to employ the 86th, 87th and Indian Brigades against the J trenches and Gully Ravine, and the 156th Brigade, supported if necessary by the 88th Brigade, against the H trenches on Fir Tree Spur. As a large percentage of his regimental officers had only recently arrived and were quite inexperienced, his instructions for the conduct of the battle were very detailed and covered nearly ten pages of foolscap.²

The action was to begin at 9 A.M.,³ with a preliminary bombardment by howitzers and heavy artillery and by the guns of the supporting ships. At 10.20 A.M. the field artillery was to begin wire-cutting, and between the bursts of fire three batteries of machine-guns (22 guns) were to enfilade the forward Turkish trenches from positions on the eastern side of the ravine.

At 10.45 A.M. the artillery was to lift off the Boomerang

¹ The ammunition sanctioned for, and actually expended in, the battle, and the approximate amounts left in the southern zone at the end of the day, were:

	<i>Sanctioned.</i>	<i>Expended.</i>	<i>Remaining on 29th June.</i>
10-pdr. shrapnel	400	680	2,500
15-pdr. "	600	776	4,900
18-pdr. "	8,000	13,046	13,000
60-pdr. "	100	118	200
" H.E.	150	185	
4.5-in. H.E.	200	197	
" shrapnel	400	479	400
5-in. H.E.	400	363	368
6-in. H.E.	550	371	629
" shrapnel	100	45	
	<u>10,900</u>	<u>16,260</u>	<u>21,997</u>

These totals are exclusive of the rounds fired by supporting ships and the French howitzers, for which no figures are available.

In the battle of the 4th June, the total expenditure of ammunition on the whole British front amounted to only 11,000 rounds.

² Appendix 1.

³ This was now recognized as the earliest hour at which the light was good enough for accurate shooting on the hostile lines in the southern area.

June, redoubt, and this work was to be rushed by a battalion of the 87th Brigade.

At 11 A.M. the whole of the artillery was to lift and the first phase of the main advance begin. The 87th Brigade was to take the first three trenches on Gully Spur, and Gully Ravine as far north as J11. At the same time the 156th Brigade was to capture its whole objective on Fir Tree Spur. The left flank of the 87th Brigade was to be protected by units of the Indian brigade advancing along the cliffs. Detachments from the Indian brigade would also be responsible for occupying the southern half of J11a as soon as it was captured.

The second phase would consist of the capture of J12 and J13 by the 86th Brigade, which was to advance from the old British front line in time to assault J12 at 11.50 A.M.¹ After the capture of J13 this brigade was to dig and occupy a new line from the right of that trench, down the eastern bank of the Nullah and Gully Ravine to H12.

During the second phase, units of the Indian brigade would again push forward along the cliffs to protect the left flank, and, after the capture of J13, would extend the left of the line to the seashore in addition to occupying the whole of J11a as a fire trench facing east. All infantry battalions were to attack in three lines—assaulting parties, supports and reserves. Owing to the great heat, packs were not to be carried.

An innovation to assist the artillery was that every man in the assault was to carry a large triangular piece of biscuit tin tied to his back.² It was intended that these shining triangles should subsequently be placed on the parapets of captured trenches, in order to show the furthest points attained.³

The task of the troops on Gully Spur was looked upon as the most difficult as well as the most important part of the operation. For this reason, the greater part of the available artillery was to be concentrated on the J trenches, while the assault of the H trenches by the 156th Brigade was to be only lightly supported. "The task of capturing the H12 line", ran the 29th Division's instructions to the 156th Brigade, "has on previous occasions proved easy.⁴ Failure to retain possession "has been due to want of support on the left of that line [*i.e.*

¹ To facilitate close co-operation between the 86th and 87th Brigades, their headquarters were to be established side by side.

² A red triangular patch was subsequently adopted as the divisional sign of the 29th Division.

³ In practice, these tins, like the red screens on 4th June, were not very satisfactory. The gunners sometimes imagined a trench to be in British occupation long after its captors had been driven out by counter-attack.

⁴ This statement, made apparently to hearten the troops, is not borne out by the story of the 4th June. See Chapter 1V.

"Gully Spur] which will now be forthcoming. . . . It is June, anticipated that the artillery bombardment on this occasion, which is more intense than any in Flanders in support of our troops, will render the task of the brigade easy."

This last sentence referred, however, to the bombardment on the western side of the ravine. It was subsequently related by Br.-General H. A. D. Simpson Baikie, commanding the VIII Corps artillery, that the corps commander, when examining his programme for the bombardment, remarked on the poverty of the support to be given to the 156th Brigade. Simpson Baikie could only reply that he agreed, but that there were no more guns available, and that to reduce the bombardment of Gully Spur would gravely prejudice the chances of progress in that quarter, where, he understood, success was more vital than on the right. An effort was then made to obtain the loan of more howitzers or ammunition from the French, but without success. Apart, therefore, from one French howitzer transferred from the left flank attack, the only artillery to fire on the H trenches consisted of 4½ batteries of 18-pdrs.

Many improvements had been made during the past few weeks in the organization of the British lines. A wide cart-track, out of sight of the enemy and practically immune from his fire, had been constructed under the cliffs from Lancashire Landing to Gully Beach and thence up Gully Ravine. "Up" and "down" communication trenches had been completed to each section of the firing line, and a special communication trench, known as "Eastern Mule Trench", and broad enough for loaded pack-mules, had been dug from near Pink Farm to Twelve Tree Copse, where it joined the reserve trenches of the division in front line.

On the 26th June General Hunter-Weston reported to G.H.Q.: "All preparatibns for our attack on the left have now been made. De Lisle has had conference with his brigadiers, and they all like the scheme and are confident as to the result."

The morning of the 28th June was fiercely hot, with scarcely a breath of wind. Br.-General Marshall, commanding the 87th Brigade, had placed the 2/South Wales Borderers and the 1/Border Regiment in front line and the 1/Inniskilling Fusiliers and the 1/King's Own Scottish Borderers in support. The Border Regiment, moving on the left bank of Gully Ravine, was to rush the Boomerang redoubt and the small portion of Turkey Trench still in enemy hands a quarter of an hour before the main advance began, and then to clear Gully Ravine as far north as its junction with H12. The South Wales Borderers were to capture J9 and J10. The K.O.S.E. and Inniskillings

28 June. were to leapfrog over them and capture J11 and the southern half of J11a. The whole brigade was in fine fettle; abundance of artillery support was assured; the leading battalion (South Wales Borderers) had rehearsed the operation on the previous evening, so that every N.C.O. and man knew exactly what was required of him; and throughout the brigade all ranks were confident of success.

Br.-General W. Scott-Moncrieff, commanding the 156th Brigade, was attacking the H trenches with the 1/8th Scottish Rifles on the right, the 1/7th Royal Scots in the centre¹ and the 1/4th Royal Scots on the left. The 1/7th Scottish Rifles was in brigade reserve. H12 was the final objective of the brigade.

Apart from a short spell in the line a few days earlier, the 156th Brigade had not been in action before, and conditions were strange and trying. Units had taken over the front-line trenches from the 88th Brigade overnight, but there had been little sleep for anyone, a number of casualties had been suffered from enemy shell fire while moving up from the rest area, and the Scottish trenches had been somewhat heavily shelled since early morning.

The Indian brigade (Major-General H. V. Cox) was bivouacking in Gurkha Ravine and Bruce's Ravine,² ready to carry out the movement along the cliffs. The 2/10th Gurkhas was to take part in the first phase, and the 1/6th Gurkhas in the second. The 1/5th Gurkhas was to follow in support, and the 14th Sikhs to hold the original front line on Gully Spur after the advance of the 86th Brigade.

In the 86th Brigade, the 2/Royal Fusiliers was to advance from the old front line to assault J12, J13, and the eastern bank of the Nullah, the 1/Royal Munster Fusiliers following in close support. The 1/Lancashire Fusiliers was to swing right handed in order to connect the right of the Royal Fusiliers with the left of the 156th Brigade at H12. The 1/Royal Dublin Fusiliers was to remain in brigade reserve.

The 88th Brigade (Colonel Cayley) had three battalions in divisional reserve in rear of the 156th Brigade. Its fourth battalion was holding the front line from the right of the 156th to the left of the 42nd Division. The headquarters of the 88th and 156th were side by side in the Eski Line.

The British bombardment opened at 9 A.M., and continued

¹ This battalion, which had lost half its numbers in the Gietna railway disaster (see page 77), consisted of only two companies, one of its own and one of the 1/8th Highland L.I. attached.

² Shown on Sketch 5.



Green Copyright.

X BEACH, SHOWING THE CONST ROAD TO GULLY RAVINE

Imperial War Museum Photo.

with growing intensity till zero hour. At 10.45 A.M. The Border 28 June. Regiment, racing across the open in three lines, captured the Boomerang redoubt and one hundred dazed prisoners with only trifling loss, thanks very largely to an effective bombardment by the two French mortars. Turkey Trench was also captured, but with rather greater trouble.

At 11 A.M. the guns lengthened their range, and on both sides of Gully Ravine the waiting infantry surged forward to the assault. On Gully Spur the bombardment had been so intense that the two front lines of Turkish trenches were already practically destroyed and their occupants wounded or killed. The 87th Brigade, therefore, was able to seize its objectives without a hitch, and exactly in accordance with plan.¹

To the east of Gully Ravine things did not go so well. On this part of the front, owing to the few British guns available, the Turks had probably suffered less from the British fire than the attacking troops waiting in the trenches had suffered from the Turkish counter-bombardments, and as soon as the attack began the casualties of the assaulting troops became exceptionally severe. On the front of the 1/4th and 1/7th Royal Scots the preliminary bombardment had accomplished a certain amount of destruction, and the enemy's second line of trenches was captured by a very gallant charge. But nearly all the officers of the attacking units were already casualties, and the commanding officer of the 1/4th Royal Scots had been mortally wounded. On the right, the situation was more serious still. To this section of the attack not a single round of high-explosive shell had been allotted, and the shrapnel had done little damage. When, therefore, the moment for assault arrived, the Turkish garrison was still unshaken, and the 1/8th Scottish Rifles was met by a deadly fire not only from the front, but from an unsuspected nest of machine guns in H13. The leading ranks were shot down as soon as they reached the open, the supports and reserves met a similar fate, and in less than five minutes the battalion had lost 25 officers out of 26 and over 400 men. A few men on the left reached the Turkish front line, where they joined up with the 1/7th Royal Scots. Elsewhere the attack had collapsed, and the shattered remnants of the battalion were staggering back to their own lines.

At first the seriousness of the situation was not realized at divisional headquarters,² and at 11.40 A.M. General de Lisle,

¹ The South Wales Borderers suffered a number of casualties from a machine gun on the right flank.

² Divisional headquarters were being badly served with information. An artillery colonel who was in a forward O.P. at the time, writes: "From the

28 June. knowing only that the right of the objective was still in enemy hands, signalled to the brigade:

H12 is to be taken at all costs. If necessary you will send forward your reserve battalion.

Thereupon Br.-General Scott-Moncrieff ordered two companies of the 1/7th Scottish Rifles from reserve to renew the attack. He then hurried forward to gain a personal knowledge of the situation. Forty minutes later he reported that a few men of the 1/7th had reached the Turkish front line and that he was sending his last two companies to support them.

Without the help of artillery, however, success was out of the question. In a final effort the gallant brigadier placed himself at the head of his last reserve but was killed as he reached the end of a forward sap. A few moments later, after suffering very heavy losses, the survivors of these two companies were driven back to their starting-point.

Meanwhile on Gully Spur everything for a time continued to go well. By noon the Royal Fusiliers were in possession of J12 and J13; the Gurkhas, on their left, had cleared J11a, and were in occupation of a spur running down to the sea somewhat in advance of J13;¹ and the Lancashire Fusiliers were moving right-handed to their objective on the eastern bank of Gully Ravine.

The Turks, however, had not yet accepted defeat. Heavy fire soon began to fall on all the captured trenches, and about 2 P.M. there began a succession of fierce bombing attacks against the eastern ends of the trenches which abutted on the Nullah. In attacks of this nature the Turks still held a great advantage: they were well supplied with bombs, all of which were far superior to any possessed by the Expeditionary Force. During the afternoon the British were driven from the eastern halves of J12 and J13, while further to the south all but a few of the Lancashire Fusiliers were forced back to the western bank of Gully Ravine.

About 6 P.M. first the 1/5th Gurkhas and then the Royal Munster Fusiliers were ordered forward to retake the lost portions of J12 and J13, and this was eventually done. But at nightfall the Turks attacked again with showers of bombs, and, after heavy fighting, the ends nearest the Nullah remained in Turkish hands.

"O.P. it was quite evident that the 156th Brigade had been knocked out and the attack was a failure."

¹ Afterwards known as Fusilier Bluff.

About 6 P.M., too, the Royal Dublin Fusiliers were ordered 28 June. to proceed to the junction of H12 and Gully Ravine, where The Border Regiment had made a barricade across the ravine, and then to attack up Gully Ravine and the Nullah as far as J12. Encountering heavy opposition the Dublins could make little progress up the ravine, so after dark they tried to dig a line along its western bank to connect with J12. Owing to frequent counter-attacks, however, this task proved equally impracticable, and the Dublins' left eventually pivoted back to the centre of J11a. This line they held despite the loss of nearly all their officers.

On the right, after the death of General Scott-Moncrieff, General de Lisle placed the 156th Brigade under the 88th, and ordered the commander of the 88th to take the portions of H12 that were still held by the Turks. In the course of the afternoon at least two bold attempts were made by weak detachments of Territorials to push forward without artillery, and both were driven back. Subsequently, about 5.30 P.M. the 1/Essex Regiment and the 1/5th Royal Scots were ordered to assault the hostile line at 6.45 P.M. supported by a few guns. But the troops of the 88th Brigade could make no better progress than those of the 156th. After dark the 2/Hampshire Regiment was sent forward to relieve the 1/4th and 1/7th Royal Scots in the western end of H12, and, despite a sharp counter-attack by a detachment of Turks about midnight, the relief was completed before dawn.

The 86th Brigade was relieved the following afternoon 29 June. (29th June) by units of the 87th Brigade and the Indian brigade, and to these two brigades and the 88th was entrusted the task of holding and consolidating the captured ground. Fighting continued intermittently in J13, and the western half of this trench changed hands several times before it was finally taken by a mixed detachment of the 1/5th and 1/6th Gurkhas on the morning of the 30th June.¹

The outstanding lesson of the British attack was the urgent need for more howitzers and high-explosive shell, and more and better bombs. Thanks to the concentration of fire against the J trenches, General de Lisle had succeeded in the first instance in gaining practically the whole of his objectives on Gully Spur, but, owing to the inadequate supply of British bombs, the enemy had regained a firm foothold in J12 and J13, and had retained possession of the eastern banks of the Nullah and

¹ The 1/5th Gurkhas by this time had only one British officer left (Lieut. K. C. S. Erskine), and the battalion was therefore attached to the 1/6th Gurkhas.

June. Gully Ravine. On the right, with no support from high-explosive shell, the British assault had failed.¹

The British casualties in the attack had been far heavier than was expected or at first realized by the corps commander,² and the heavy inroad on ammunition reserves was a source of much anxiety at G.H.Q. But the advance on Gully Spur was of great tactical importance; 'it was already plain that the Turks, too, had suffered heavy casualties; and it had again been proved that their positions were untenable against a reasonable proportion of high-explosive shell.

In the French zone an important success was gained on the 30th June. Towards the end of the month General Gouraud had determined on a further effort to capture the Quadrilateral while the Turks were still disorganized by the battle on the British front. This task was entrusted to the 7th Colonial Regiment, and the French battleship *Suffren* was sent up from Mudros to co-operate by keeping down the Asiatic fire from a position within the Straits.

Early on the 30th, while fighting was still going on in J13, the French Colonials attacked with great dash. They were supported by a violent artillery bombardment, and in less than an hour had gained not only the whole of the Quadrilateral, but several trenches beyond. Some of this captured ground was retaken a few hours later by counter-attack; but the greater part of the Quadrilateral remained in French hands, and one of the most serious obstacles to an advance by the British right had at last been removed.

As soon as this important news reached General Hunter-Weston, he hurried over to French headquarters and concerted plans for the next British attack. It was decided that, provided the necessary ammunition could be made available, the capture of Achi Baba could be brought one step nearer in the course of the next few days by an attack by the Royal Naval Division, supported by French and British guns, and the making of another breach in the enemy's forward line. General Hunter-

¹ In reporting the result of the battle, General Hunter-Weston telegraphed on 29th June: "It was unavoidable, owing to the shortage of howitzers and ammunition, that the trenches east of the ravine were insufficiently bombarded by howitzer high-explosive shell. This was the cause of the failure and the heavy casualties at this point. A complete success yesterday would have required another 8 howitzers and 600 more rounds of ammunition."

² The British casualties on 28th June were at first assessed at 2,000. Actually between 28th-30th June they amounted to 3,800, most of which were suffered on 28th. The 156th Brigade lost 1,353—nearly half its total strength.

Weston pointed out, however, that no further attack could be made by the VIII Corps till the 157th Brigade of the 52nd Division had arrived on the peninsula to strengthen his corps reserve.

But the 30th June, which had begun so auspiciously for the French, was to end on a note of tragedy. As soon as the *Suffren* withdrew from the Straits, the batteries on the Asiatic shore reopened a heavy fire, and General Gouraud was gravely wounded while walking across V Beach to visit his men in hospital. The French troops were thus deprived of a leader who, in six short weeks, had won the respect and confidence of all who came in contact with him. By everyone in the Expeditionary Force, the news of his loss was received with consternation.¹

The success of the British advance on Gully Spur was proving such a menace to the safety of the hostile line south of Krithia that the Turks now endeavoured to retrieve the situation by driving in the British left flank. Their first effort began on the night of the 30th June with a determined bombing attack from the Nullah on the 1/5th and 1/6th Gurkhas in the western half of J13. The Gurkhas, having no bombs, were forced back, but a counter-attack with *kukris*, led by Lieut.-Colonel Hon. C. G. Bruce, succeeded in regaining a small portion of the line.

The following night (1st July) a stronger attack was made on the portion of J12 held by the 2/10th Gurkhas, and on a partly finished trench² held by the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, which ran south from the barricade in J12. Again, owing to lack of bombs, the troops were forced to give ground. But 1½ companies of the Inniskillings, under Captain G. R. O'Sullivan, restored the situation, and recaptured the whole of J12 as far as the Nullah.³ Owing to an unfortunate misunderstanding, the garrison of J12 fell back to the old barricade in that trench at daybreak without further pressure from the enemy, and shortly afterwards the empty portion of the trench was re-occupied by the Turks.

¹ The following telegram was received by Sir Ian Hamilton from H.M. the King: "I very much regret to hear that General Gouraud was wounded yesterday. I know what a serious loss he will be both to his own army and to you. I trust that his wounds are not serious and that he may soon recover. George R.I."

² Afterwards called "Inniskilling Inch".

³ For their gallantry on this occasion, Captain O'Sullivan and Corporal James Somers were awarded the V.C., and Somers was specially promoted to sergeant on the field. The V.C. was also won by 2/Lieut. H. James, 4/Worcesterhire Regiment, for gallantry in the H trenches on 28th June and again on 3rd July.

July. Encouraged by this success, the local Turkish commander attempted on the evening of the 2nd July to break in the head of the British salient by attacks across the open against Fusilier Bluff and the western end of J13, held by the Inniskillings and the 1/5th Gurkhas.


About 6 P.M., after a short and ineffective bombardment, strong parties of infantry began to approach the British line from the north, some of them moving along the top of the cliff, others across the steep spurs which here run down to the sea. This attack was dispersed by the guns of the *Scorpion*, lying off the coast; but an hour later the Turkish artillery again came into action, and just before dark about 1,800 Turks advanced across the open from the northern end of the Nullah.

The Turks offered an unrivalled target, and soon came under heavy fire from the 10th Battery R.F.A., and from the garrison holding the line. Five other batteries were quickly in action, and the British shrapnel was able to show its great value in defence. Numbers of the 1/6th Gurkhas, dashing forward from the support trenches and finding the front line already too full to hold them, flung themselves down behind the parapets to join in the fusillade. The majority of the Turks were beaten to the ground by this fire, while still a long way from their objective. A few, very gallantly led by their officers, succeeded in getting to within forty yards of the British line. But it was all of no avail, and, as night closed in, the scattered remnants of the assaulting battalions were streaming back in disorder. British patrols sent out later reported that the ground in front was "carpeted" with dead.

For the next 48 hours the enemy showed no sign of activity, and by the evening of the 4th July he seemed to have given up hope of regaining the lost ground. But the heaviest attack of all was still to come.

According to the Turkish official account, the British success of the 28th June left the Turks so alarmed for the safety of their southern front that three reinforcing divisions were ordered south to restore the situation. By the evening of the 3rd July the 5th Division had arrived from the Anzac zone, the 3rd Division from Kum Kale and the 4th Division from Bulair. It was at first arranged that an attack in force should be launched on both sides of Gully Ravine on the morning of the 4th July. On the afternoon of the 3rd, however, Liman von Sanders himself arrived on the southern front, and, in view of the heavy defeat of the local attacks carried out on the previous evening, the orders for the 4th were countermanded. To give more time for preparation, the main attack was postponed till the

Sketch 8.



morning of the 5th, and it was further decided to enlarge the *July*. scope of the operation and make a simultaneous attack against the whole of the British front. The *3rd Division* was to assault the J trenches and the *5th Division* the H trenches, while the attack on the remainder of the line was to be carried out by the existing Turkish garrison. The *4th Division* was held in reserve.

These preparations were completed without attracting the attention of the British troops, and at dawn on the 5th the attack began with a bombardment of the British front. Again, however, the Turkish artillery did little damage, and when, about 4.15 A.M., the assaulting troops appeared in the open they were driven back to their line with severe loss. During the morning repeated efforts were made to renew the attack, but the Turkish infantry could not be persuaded to move. At one point, on the front of the Royal Naval Division, a small party managed to reach the British trenches, but a company of the Anson Battalion expelled it by a counter-attack. At midday the Turkish attack had everywhere failed with enormous casualties, while the British losses had been negligible.

From the very large numbers of dead in front of the British lines it was clear that the enemy had suffered a heavy defeat, and his losses since the 28th June were computed by the VIII Corps to be not less than 10,000. But even this figure was an under-estimate. The Turkish official account admits that between the 28th June and the 5th July, their losses amounted to no less than 16,500 men, of whom 14,000 fell in the fighting on both sides of Gully Ravine. "The Battle of Zighin Dere" [Gully Ravine], it is confessed, "was the most costly action yet fought on the peninsula."

The Turks made no further effort to recapture the lost ground, and their official account admits that the situation on the evening of the 5th gave rise to much anxiety. "It seemed highly probable that the British would now be able to envelop our right flank. . . . All our troops on the southern front were tired out and badly intermixed, and the *4th Division* was the only fresh formation available to meet an attack." But the British and French troops were equally weary, and there were no reserves of men and ammunition to exploit the situation. Until the 12th July it was not even possible to carry out the limited operation already planned for the right-hand division of the VIII Corps; and during the respite thus given to them, the Turks brought more troops to the peninsula and readjusted their line.

On the morning of the 9th July the Turkish commander

9 July. asked for a short armistice to bury his dead. On grounds of humanity as well as of health, Sir Ian Hamilton was ready to agree. But it was suggested by the VIII Corps that a probable reason for the request was that Turkish reinforcements would not renew the attack over ground that was thickly strewn with Turkish dead. For this reason, and as most of the British garrison at Helles were very war-worn and ammunition scarce, the Turkish request was refused.¹

¹ General Kannengiesser, "Gallipoli", p. 146, mentions the callous attitude of Turkish soldiers towards their unburied dead. It seems, therefore, that the opinion held by the VIII Corps was incorrect.